

Economic Development Efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa:

Implications for Business Prospects

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Table of Contents

Introduction.....
Historical Perspectives.....
Economic Factors affecting Market and Investment Potential.....
Economic performance.....
Legal barriers to entry.....
Structural adjustment.....
Political Factors affecting Market Potential.....
Political Stability.....
Democratization.....
Conclusions.....
Index of Tables and Figures.....

Table 1. Political Data for Sub-Saharan Africa: Independence to Present	
Table 2. GDP Data for Sub-Saharan Africa: 1960-90.....	
Table 3. GDP Data for Sub-Saharan Africa: 1965 or Latest Data.....	
Table 4. Structural Adjustment Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa.....	
Figure 1. North Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present.....	
Figure 2. Northeastern Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present.....	
Figure 3. East Africa and Zaire GDP Trends: 1960-Present.....	
Figure 4. West Africa Franc Zone GDP Trends: 1960-Present.....	
Figure 5. Anglophone West Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present.....	
Figure 6. Other West Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present.....	
Figure 7. Central Africa Franc Zone GDP Trends: 1960-Present.....	
Figure 8. Southern Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present.....	
Figure 9. Indian Ocean and Mozambique GDP Trends: 1960-Present.....	
Figure 10. Four Patterns of Economic Development.....	

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Introduction

Since independence the economic performance of the sub-Saharan region has varied greatly among the forty-six countries included in this study. Generally, however, the trend in real, per capita income has been downward, especially since the 1973 oil crisis.

What does this mean for the future of international business and investment in the region? Obviously falling real incomes reduce the potential of the subcontinent as an important market for the products of the rest of the world. On the other hand, the accompanying reduction in the size of public sector employment in most of the region has added many well-educated workers to the unemployed labor force. These workers potentially can be employed by the rapidly-expanding, and far more productive private sector. This trend from public to private sector enterprise has made the region far more attractive to foreign direct investors.

Another factor leading to a greater attractiveness of foreign investment has been the movement

toward greater transparency of business codes and financial markets. As I will discuss later in the paper, the urgent need to bolster stagnant economies has forced many of the governments of the to seek IMF and World Bank assistance, which is conditional on economic reforms among which are simplification of the legal system and functional financial markets.

In this paper I have compiled country and regional data and summarized pro-business developments for each country in the region. I also list data and business information sources useful to those interested in marketing and investing in the region.

Historical Perspectives

Many of us have only a limited knowledge of a region that, for too long, was known as the “Dark Continent”. In fact, Africa as a collection of a great variety of diverse states and peoples, each with its own cultures, potential, and challenges. To generalize about the countries and the economies of Africa would be a mistake when trying to assess the feasibility of conducting business there.

The history of modern Africa is very modern indeed by most any standard. Despite being the cradle of Man, Africa’s colonial legacy eliminated virtually any vestige of social and political arrangements that existed before the Europeans’ arrival, leaving only a western political model to be adopted and adapted by newly-created nation states. Due to the newness of political freedom, developments there have been very rapid. Names have changed as well as regimes. Governmental changes have been common.

To help “keep score” I have provided Table 1, which lists the names of the countries and provides historical and political information about each, including the year of independence, the name of the capital, its former colonial name, and some of its leaders. As can be seen from the Table, many of the leaders came to power as the result of military coups.

While we still hear from time to time about a new military takeover (most recently in Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in fact, these have become increasingly rare events, as can be seen in the last column of Table 1. The fact that far more often governments are elected rather than imposed by force, is a welcome trend; however, this veils the fact that a majority of the “elections” are either fraudulent or meaningless. In only a handful of countries are elections truly free, multiparty events.

It is still heartening that politicians are making an effort to appear democratic rather than continue

Since independence the economic performance of the sub-Saharan regio...varied greatly among the forty-five countries included in this study

blatant authoritarian activity. One important factor that that has led to this phenomenon is the collapse of the Soviet Union; no longer can African states play off one super power against the other. In addition, the United States, other Western nations, and the international organizations have made it clear that they expect client states to conduct politics more openly if they are to receive bilateral and multilateral aid.

In the next two sections I will discuss general economic and political factors that need to be considered by prospective investors in deciding whether or not to market or invest directly in this very dynamic region of the world.

Economic Factors affecting Market and Investment Potential

Economic factors that influence the potential of Africa as a market or investment include the following:

Economic performance

As one might expect, the economic picture in sub-Saharan Africa is not rosy; quite the opposite, virtually all the countries have experienced significant retrograde over the past decade. This observation is consistent with that of the World Bank a decade earlier. In the words of the World Bank report [Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action](#)

Output per person rose more slowly in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other part of the world, particularly in the 1970s and it rose more slowly in the 1970s than in the 1960s. The tragedy of this slow growth in the African setting is that incomes are so low and access to basic services so limited. Now, against a backdrop of global economic recession, the outlook for all less-developed nations - but especially for the sub-Saharan region - is grim^[1]

As there is no point in trying to sell sophisticated machinery in a country where average incomes are less than \$200, this economic indicator, regardless of the growth rate of GDP, is an important measure. At the same time, such a country might be the perfect market for cheap watches or simple, inexpensive solar cookers in a desert country.

Growth in per capita GDP is an important indicator, as it indicates the likely future extent of a market. For example, Cameroon has traditionally been one of the wealthier countries of Africa. As late as 1990, real, per capita GDP in that country was estimated at over \$1200. But the growth rate in per capita GDP for the latter half of the 1980's was negative. In fact, as a result of mismanagement of the economy and devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, per capita GDP in Cameroon was estimated at just \$530 in 1995, less than that of the average African country.

Table 2 lists real, per capita GDP and growth rates for African countries for the years 1960-90 as estimated by Lawrence Summers and Alan Heston. These estimates are based on purchasing power parity, a measure intended to take into account the cost of living differences across countries with very different cultures and market baskets. This approach is useful in comparing standards of living, but overstates the foreign goods purchasing power of an economy.

As it is often easier to visualize growth trends by means of a graphical representation, I have also provided a series of time series plots for the countries of the region to help trace the development trends of the region. These were done for each country and grouped by eight subregions in the continent. The subregional graphs are provided with this paper.

As can be seen from the Table and the graphs, with few exceptions, growth rates have declined markedly from those of the 1970-80 period, despite a decline in oil prices and generally improved world growth rates in the developed world.

Table 3 also shows GDP per capita for 1995, or the latest year for which data are available for forty-six sub-Saharan countries. These GDP estimates are based on actual values in local currency converted into dollars using exchange rates. These estimates more accurately reflect the purchasing power of the country for imports, and therefore, are useful for determining the size of the market for imported goods and services in each country.

South Africa is the only country with more than 2 million population having more than \$1000 per capita GDP. Nigeria, the most populous country had GDP of less than \$700 per person. Ethiopia, with nearly 60 million people, had GDP of less than \$100 per person. Clearly, based on GDP figures alone, opportunities for exporting to most of this region are limited at best, with the exception of southern Africa.

For simplicity, I have classified countries into one of four categories based on their development pattern: (-, -), (+, -), (-, +), and (+, +). The signs represent the changes from the previous decade of the percent

growth in per capita GDP given in Table 3. Thus, a country classified as (+ , -) had higher growth in the 1970s than in the 1960s, but lower growth in the 1980s than in the 1970s. At the bottom of Figure 4 I have listed the countries falling into each group. Note that no country is a (+ , +); 16 countries were classified as (+ , -); 10 were classified as (- , +), although two of these - Ghana and Sierra Leone - had virtually the same growth rates in the '70s and '80s; and 18 countries have growth rates that have steadily worsened.

Oddly enough, one factor that improves export prospects is the maldistribution of income in most of Africa. Much of the measured GDP is in the hands of just a few people. The middle class is small and there is usually a small, but powerful, wealthy class. These are often of foreign origin or are the ruling elite and their families. Luxury goods are often found in the market side-by-side with cheap local goods or goods imported from neighboring countries. It is not uncommon to find fashionable boutiques selling expensive Rolex watches, and just outside the door young hawkers are selling Nigerian watches for two or three dollars apiece. Market assessment requires one to examine the size and wealth of the upper class in each country to determine the depth of the market.

Legal barriers to entry

Many of the countries of the region have a tradition of protectionism. During much of the post-independence period, the nations followed socialist, or even communist, economic regimes. Many other nations had preferential trade relations, usually with the former colonial master state. This is particularly true of the former French colonies.

It is generally true that almost all of the countries in the region today have opened their markets at least legally, if not de facto. Events in the European Union have necessitated equal treatment to member states of the Union. On the other hand, there are still many non-tariff, non-legal barriers to be encountered.

One of these is corruption in the customs services. Low wages in the public sector and non-payment of public servants are common occurrences, and it is frequently necessary to “grease the palms” of someone before goods are expedited. In addition, one often encounters a certain amount of resistance by consumers who are more accustomed to the products of the former colonial power. People in francophone countries just like things French. They have a long tradition of buying these products and feel it their “patriotic” duty to buy them, just as many citizens of the United States like “American” goods and will resist buying superior Japanese or European products.

These monetary and non-monetary barriers reduce the potential market still further. For example, a 50

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percent tariff rate, or a bribe of that magnitude, effectively reduces the real purchasing power of the local income to two-third of that estimated in Table 3. In addition, consumer resistance means the price must be reduced below that of the competing, preferred product, in order to sell it.

These factors must be analyzed before attempting to enter such markets. As a general rule, however, the African market is very limited, and there is very little opportunity, at this time, to sell in that market except, as noted earlier, to a small, wealthy class for which price is no object.

Structural adjustment

In my opinion one of the most positive influences on the markets of Africa has been the increasing influence of the international organizations, and particularly the IMF and the World Bank, to persuade African countries to liberalize their economies.

The World Bank report cited above noted the need to refocus development efforts away from centralized planning toward greater reliance on the private sector and market forces. The Accelerated Development report calls for the liberalization of markets in the sub-Saharan states. This "structural adjustment" of the sub-Saharan economies was expected to unleash natural market forces to direct scarce resources to their highest use value.

Future development funds from the major multilateral donors, the World Bank and the IMF, were made conditional on the governments' commitment to pursuing the structural adjustment. This process is often referred to as "conditionality". Furthermore, many of the bilateral donors have come to rely on monitoring by the multilateral donors in conditioning their funds as well. Thus, World Bank/IMF consultative teams examining adherence to structural adjustment principles have enormous power over recipient governments.

As a consequence of this clout, national leaders have often blamed these organizations for draconian measures called for in structural adjustment plans. To sweeten the medicine, the multilateral donors provide additional funds, called structural adjustment loans, or SALs, to soften the shock during the adjustment period. Originally, it was anticipated that the majority of the states would require a rather brief period of adjustment, around five years or less, to make the adjustments.

Unfortunately, experience has shown that, for various reasons, this period is far too short for most countries. For several reasons - flagging commitment by governments, changes in the ruling elite,

persistent structural imbalances, external events, etc. - states have required far longer to make the necessary changes called for by conditionality. This has led to increased impatience on the part of multilateral and bilateral donors, who expected quicker transformation.

Before discussing further the history of structural adjustment, a summary of the measures included in the structural adjustment process is in order. A structural adjustment program consists of one or more of the following:

1. Internal and external balance. National budget deficits to be eliminated by increased revenues, usually via more efficient tariff collection, and a reduction in national expenditures. The latter usually means laying off many public officials and reducing their salaries. Balance of payments to be achieved via a realistic, market-determined exchange rate; this has often resulted in devaluation of the host currency. Foreign exchange rationing to be eliminated.
2. Where a problem, inflation to be brought under control via monetary restraint. This has been a severe problem in those countries having national currencies; it has been much less of a problem in the franc zone.
3. Privatization of parastatals, where appropriate, to reduce losses on unprofitable state enterprises or to promote greater efficiency in profitable ones.
4. Elimination of unnecessary government regulations to reduce corruption and expand production.
5. Promotion of financial intermediaries to make greater capital available for domestic investment. A market-determined interest rate to lead to efficient rationing of scarce national savings.

These are the major elements of structural adjustment. As can be seen, they call for a general liberalization of the economy of the country. Obviously, such a program is very ambitious and requires some time to achieve.

In anticipation of the evils of the structural adjustment process, the countries of Africa drafted their own development strategy, known as the Lagos Plan of Action. Adopted in April 1980 by the Organization for African Unity, the Lagos Plan called for greater collective self-reliance. Unfortunately, the plan was lacking in detail about how the objectives outlined in the plan should be achieved.[\[2\]](#)

Despite its critics, serious adherence to a structural adjustment program, or SAP, can lead to very positive developments, as occurred in Egypt and is occurring in Ghana today. Table 4 lists sub-Saharan African countries with SAPs in place or completed.

Political Factors affecting Market Potential

Political Stability

In addition to the economic viability of a country, potential investors need to assess its political stability. There are two main considerations here: safety of the investment, and its efficiency.

A stable political system may be the result of a strongman military regime that can guarantee that the investment will not be expropriated via a socialist takeover, but such regimes are often corrupt, leading to a frittering away of profits through a system of bribes and payoffs. Merely examining investment codes will do nothing to assure a potential investors that they will not in fact be constantly harassed by “sons-in-law” of the President or general or some customs official looking for handouts.

The best way to find out about the true climate for investment is to contact your embassy. Normally there is someone assigned to advise prospective investors of the current situation. While I was in Yaounde I often had discussions with the economic officer at the US embassy. His assessment of the environment there, in part due to information I provided, led him to conclude that no American should consider investing in Cameroon; it pained him to have to advise people to stay away, and it was the first occasion in his career that he had to do so. Increasingly, this has been the assessment of economic officers in African countries as regimes become more and more corrupt.

Ironically, these developments are closely linked to the economic environment and to liberalization of many of the economies. As governments are forced to streamline and privatize, more and more functionaries are left unemployed or, worse, unpaid. Often the sole means of support for the latter group is to engage in rent-seeking behavior, using their official status to extort payments from clients.

Personally, it was very frustrating to have to transport someone to my house to have him connect my telephone wire to the house and then also to have to pay him to perform the work so that I could have service. But without that I would never have been hooked up. The same was true of water and electricity. But the parastatals responsible for providing these services are no longer funded sufficiently to pay their own employees and their collection systems are antiquated and often six months or more behind schedule.

Democratization

Two recurring themes in the United States' relationship with developing countries have been democracy and human rights. While a democratic regime may trample on individual freedoms and an authoritarian regime may be very respectful of human rights, generally the level of respect for human rights is highly correlated to the level of democracy in a country.

In the President's recent visits to Africa and China, he stressed the importance of democratization and the respect for human rights, and was very complementary of the improvements in this area in much of Africa. He spoke about a tripling in the number of regime changes the last few years that have been decided by election. We saw from Table 1 that there has been increased electoral activity. Today in only a handful of nations have the most recent changes in government been accomplished via the gun.

Unfortunately, many of these elections are not what we in the West consider to be elections. Still, there has been great improvement over the past when coups d'état were common occurrences. I have not attempted in this study to list the truly fair elections as opposed to window dressing; often opposition candidates will cry foul even in relatively fraud-free elections, while in other cases the opposition is effectively silenced in obvious rigged elections.

Far too often, however, incumbents have unfair access to a controlled mass media apparatus that is denied their opponents. Far too often parties are permitted to field candidates at the last minute or an individual that the incumbent fears will win is declared ineligible. One tactic that I particularly like is to allow a candidate to run, then have the electoral commission declare that candidate ineligible because he has not resided in the country for some period preceding the election; of course, the opponent was in exile following the preceding election that was stolen by the incumbent.

Another problem with relying on the level of democratization as a measure of business potential in a country is that, for developing countries, there is really no correlation between democracy and economic performance. China and many of the other NICs in Asia were not highly democratized during their years of maximum growth rates, nor has a country such as India done well economically even with a high degree of democracy. What is true, however, is that democracy invariably has followed economic development. For this reason I would recommend that this particular dimension not be given great consideration in deciding whether or not to invest in a country; rather political stability and economic performance should be given the most weight.

Conclusions

This paper has been an initial attempt at developing a methodology for assessing the potential for investment and marketing in developing economies. I used sub-Saharan Africa, a particularly poor region of the world and one with which I am most familiar, as a sample.

From the data gathered it does not appear, from almost any dimension examined, that there is, at this time, great potential in this region. While some gains have been made in recent years in some of the countries of the region, one can expect some backsliding in many of these countries. The attempts at democratization, economic reform efforts, and rural and urban infrastructure have been so woeful to date, that the bare necessities for successful investment are not yet in place.

Even in South Africa, the only sizable country with high per capita, GDP political stability is by no means guaranteed. Next year Nelson Mandela will step down for a younger, hand-picked successor. There a great likelihood of violence as Buthelezi and the Zulu Nation attempt to gain greater power in the government. The uncertainties have made many White South Africans seek a safer haven outside South Africa. This disinvestment will create opportunities for investors willing to take a chance on South Africa; but it is a high-risk opportunity. If violence does break out there, or if the lost investment is not replaced by new investors, South Africa will likely devolve in much the same way as has occurred in Kenya or, more recently, in Zimbabwe.

In future I will expand the work started here in two directions. First I will apply similar techniques to other regions, Eastern Europe, South Asia and the Middle East, and Latin America. Secondly, I will examine economic trends across developing countries to trace the relationship between external economic and internal political events and internal economic development. I will define a "profile of devolution" whereby internal events, such as military coups, deaths of a popular leader, tribal and civil unrest, disputes and warfare with neighboring states, etc., as well as external "shocks" like the oil crisis of the late 1970s, cause internal, economic decline. This in turn feeds back via political unrest to exacerbate the decline, which, in turn, worsens the political environment.

Profiles for all the countries in the region will be examine against a timeline of events to identify the disturbances that have had greatest impact on economic development in each country. The fact is, there are an infinite number of things that can go wrong and lead a nation down the path to economic disaster; there is only one way, or a limited number of ways, of doing things right. Economic development is more an accident than the norm, and apparently successful development efforts may go for naught if great care is not taken. Recent events in Asia, as well as the Great Depression, testify to just how fragile successful development really is.

Hopefully, examining recent economic events in the least developed nations of the world, can yield insight into the development process and help us in developing policies and development strategies to maintain a more constant growth path for those countries in greatest need.

Index of Tables and Figures

- Table 1. Political Data for Sub-Saharan Africa: Independence to Present
- Table 2. GDP Data for Sub-Saharan Africa: 1960-90
- Table 3. GDP Data for Sub-Saharan Africa: 1965 or Latest Data
- Table 4. Structural Adjustment Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa
- Table 5. List of Sources of Information About Sub-Saharan Africa
- Figure 1. North Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present
- Figure 2. Northeastern Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present
- Figure 3. East Africa and Zaire GDP Trends: 1960-Present
- Figure 4. West Africa Franc Zone GDP Trends: 1960-Present
- Figure 5. Anglophone West Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present
- Figure 6. Other West Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present
- Figure 7. Central Africa Franc Zone GDP Trends: 1960-Present
- Figure 8. Southern Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present
- Figure 9. Indian Ocean and Mozambique GDP Trends: 1960-Present

Table 1. Political Data for Sub-Saharan Africa: Independence to Present

Table 2. GDP Data for Sub-Saharan Africa: 1960-90

Table 3. GDP Data for Sub-Saharan Africa: 1965 or Latest Data

Table 4. Structural Adjustment Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa

<u>Country</u>	<u>Program</u>
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Angola	1991 - Announce economic reforms - devaluation, tax reduction, minimum wage, freer prices. Due primarily to 500% inflation measures fail.
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	1996 - Nova Vida reform to reduce inflation. IMF announces 3-year, \$75 million ESAF. National commercial bank to be sold.
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Benin	1991 - 1993-95 ESAF approved by IMF, debt rescheduled. Modified as result of 1994 CFA devaluation. New Kerekou regime to work with IMF in restructuring economy. New ESAF agreed on.
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Cemeroon	1989/90 - Economic restructure program introduced, loans from France, World Bank, ADB; liquidation of parastatals, reduce civil service and regulations. Political instability, corruption in civil service and increasing external debt impeded implementation of reforms.
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	1994 - CFA devaluation increased local value of petroleum and other exports caused brief spurt in real GDP growth; future economic success, however, requires further economic restructuring.
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Cape Verde	none
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CAR	1982 - Stand-by IMF loan, austerity plan implemented, broken 1983. 1983 - IMF loan suspended, later resumed when plan re-implemented. 1987 - Structural adjustment: liberalize, liquidate parastatals, reduce civil service, etc. Progress made 1990 - 2 nd SAF agreed to; political instability and 1994 CFA devaluation resulted in failure to maintain repayment schedule. 1996 - France supplemented salary payments; IMF talks suspended.
Chad	none
Comoros	1996 - France conditions future budget assistance on accommodation with World Bank and IMF. 1997 - 6-month IMF austerity and surveillance program implemented.
D.R. Congo	none
Rep. Congo	1989 - Economic liberalization plan implemented via revised tax structure.

Table 4 (Cont'd)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Program</u>
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1994 - CFA devaluation, implementation of restructuring and liberalization: privatization, reduction of civil service.

1996 - ESAF approved; jeopardized by political unrest in 1997.

Cote d'Ivoire 1991 - IMF/WB structural reform program implemented: fiscal austerity, market liberalization, reduce current account deficit by 50% by 1995. Targets not achieved by 1993 when govt. changed.

1994 - CFA devaluation led to marked economic recovery.

Djibouti 1995 - Announced it would not apply for IMF assistance; public salaries reduced.

1996 - Agreement with IMF concluded for \$6.7 m. stand-by credit: reform civil service, restructure public enterprises. IMF not satisfied with implementation of program.

1997 - IMF agrees to extend 2nd stand-by credit of \$6.4 m. plus \$2.8 m. credits. IDA granted \$6.5 m. for TA.

E. Guinea 1988 - IMF SAF of \$11.2 m., suspended after \$9.2 m. due to failure to reduce budget deficit.

1990 - Measures adopted to liberalize import prices, stimulate private investment, raise tariffs on public utilities. By 1994 budget still seriously in deficit.

1994-96 IMF agreed to \$12.9 m. ESAF: to diversify economy, reform public sector, restructure financial sector. By 1997 budget deficits still too large.

Eritrea 1994 - Economic reforms approved: investment, land tenure, fiscal policy, trade.

1997 - World Bank approved \$6.3 m. credit for feasibility studies.

Ethiopia 1991 - The ERRP, a program of economic restructure introduced with help of WB, IMF, ADB, et al. 1992 and 1993 birr devalued, 1993 foreign exchange auction implemented; removed capital charge on subsidies to public enterprises; partial reform of taxation; elimination of all export taxes, except for coffee. Balance of trade has improved since 1991.

Gabon Little adherence to IMF conditions in past.

1995-98 - EFF payments denied due to lack of public financial transparency. EFF includes: improved rate of return on petroleum resources; reform tax revenue system; reduction in public spending; privatization.

Table 4 (Cont'd)

Country **Program**

Gambia 1985 - ERP implemented: devaluation, 20% reduction of public service employment, privatization, liberalization of economy.

1990 - PSD continued ERP; Gambia Utilities Corp. privatized in 1993.

Ghana 1983 - ERP I introduced to stabilize economy. 1987-90 ERP II for structural adjustment and development.

1995 - 3-year, \$258 m. SAF made for 1995-97: exchange rate and trade policy reforms including devaluation and FX auction, ending import quotas, uniform customs tariff; simplify and rationalize tax system; improve tax administration; reduce import price subsidies; VAT introduced (17.5%), later withdrawn, to be reintroduced in 1998 (no specific rate); limit budget expenditures; privatization of 52 state enterprises by 1993 and planned privatization of Ghana Airways and Post and Tel. Corp. By most accounts the ERP has been quite successful.

Guinea Since Conte took over, economic reform has been implemented in agreement with IMF: privatization; liberalize foreign trade; abolition of price controls; monetary and banking reforms; reduce civil service. Reform efforts have been quite successful.

Guinea-B. 1987-89 - SAP introduced in agreement with IMF/WB: remove price and marketing controls; reform public sector.

1991 - Plan to privatize public enterprises announced. IMF unsatisfied with progress and did not renew SAF. To date little progress made.

Kenya Not met conditions of several SAFs.

Lesotho 1989 - IMF approved SAF to help raise GDP growth rate, lower debt-service ratio, reduce inflation. Policies to increase credit to private sector; encourage private investment, especially in export good and import substitutes; increase agricultural productivity. Not met

1991 - ESAF for 1991-94 program. Targets exceeded.

1995 - Privatization program unveiled; to cover five years.

Liberia Never met conditions of any loans or facilities.

Madagascar 1986-91 - Investment code introduced; rice controls abolished; exports encouraged; devaluated currency. Other positive economic measures taken.

1991 - \$1 b. public investment program financed by WB, IMF, et al: liberalize trade and finance; encourage foreign and domestic investment; privatize public enterprises; increase producer

prices.

Table 4 (Cont'd)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Program</u>
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Madagascar	1995 - Discussions with IMF/WB for new facility. None yet approved although several more measures taken: reduced inflation; new petroleum tax; restrict Central bank loans to private enterprises.
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Malawi	1981, 1986 - IMF/WB economic reform programs. Canceled in 1986. 1988 - Agreed to 14-mo. stand-by facility, debt rescheduling; 4-year ESAF. 1992 - Two devaluations. Economy suffered from external shocks. 1994 - Heavy borrowing for elections, devaluation, drought. \$40 m.WB supplement (drought recovery) approved. Unsuccessful SAP supported by 8-mo. IMF stand by. 1995 - ESAF approved conditional on ERP: economic liberalization and privatization. 26 parastatals to be privatized; eliminate agric. Monopolies; 20,000 civil servants sacked. Some success.
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Mali	1994 - Devaluation of the CFA franc.
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Mauritania	1984 - One year SAP with IMF: more care in choosing public investment projects. 1989 - ESAF: to foster private enterprise; restructure and rehabilitate banking sector. 1993 - ESAF of \$63 m.; debt restructure loan.
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Mauritius	1981 - \$15 m. SAL from WB to finance 3-year economic reform program. \$30m. stand-by credit from IMF - suspended in 1982.
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	1983 - \$49.8m. IMF credit, \$48m. WB loan. Later IMF disputed second half of credit; WB followed suit.
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	1988 - Relaxed exchange controls
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	1993 - 3-year development program to modernize and diversify economy.
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Mozambique	1987 - ERP supported by IMF: increase economic efficiency and reduce internal and external deficits by liberalizing economy; reduced expenditures, increase income taxes, reduced govt.
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wage costs and subsidies, controlled credit growth, increased minimum wage, increased basic commodity prices. Also regular devaluations of the metical.

1990 - SDR 85.4m. ESAF approved by IMF: increase role of private sector. By 1995 1000 state enterprises had been privatized.

1994 - Additional SDR 29.4 m. approved.

1997 - IMF approved \$35m. loan.

Table 4 (Cont'd)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Program</u>
Namibia	None
Niger	1983 - ESAF IMF stand-by credits, austerity budget, debt reschedule. 1994 - CFA devaluation. No ERP to speak of.
Nigeria	1986 - SAP implemented: austerity and monetary control; expand oil exports; import substitution; achieve food self-sufficiency; increase role of private sector; ban import licenses; reduce import duties. 1987 - FX auction introduced. (1991 returned control to Central Bank). 1988 - 110 public enterprises to be privatized; by 1992 90 sold. 1994 - SAP abandoned.
Reunion	1992 - Established an Export Free Zone (EFZ). 1994 - Reduced public sector employment.
Rwanda	1990 - SAP announced with IMF: 40% devaluation; liberal import licensing; increase import taxes; increase sales tax; new credit and interest rate policies. \$170 m. support raised. 1994 - War.
Sao Tome	1985 to present - SAPs to restructure economy which had been Marxist: privatize state owned shops and industries; devaluation; abolish price controls except for basic food items; wages increased; reduce state subsidies; etc. 1991 - Priority on fiscal and economic austerity; banking system reorganized. 1992 - SAF

resumed.

1994 - WB threatened to suspend SA credits due to implementation delays; failed to qualify for ESAF by IMF.

1995 - New austerity measures announced: fuel prices raised, 300 civil servants sacked; privatization to be expedited; limit wage increases of public sector to 30%; interest rate increased from 35% to 50%.

1997 - WB/IMF issue ultimatum to balance the macro economy; curb inflation and devalue currency.

Senegal 1995 - Govt. announced plans to end artificial protection of many sectors; eliminate subsidies on some food commodities; privatization of agricultural marketing, industry and public utilities; 18 state-owned enterprises offered for sale in 1997.

Seychelles 1995 - Economic Development Act: Govt. proposed program of privatization; encourages foreign investment; full repatriation of .taxed profits.

Table 4 (Cont'd)

Country **Program**

Sierra Leone 1986 - ERP implemented: floating exchange rate; elimination of Govt. rice and petroleum subsidies; liberalization of trade; increase producer prices. 1988 IMF withdrew support.

1989 - SAP program approved by IMF: increase mining revenues; reorganize loss-making public enterprises. Implementation postponed due to failure to reduce expenditures and control debt arrears.

1992 - Despite internal unrest and war, Govt. agreed to implement final stage of ERP: restrain money supply; develop FX market; improve management of natural resources.

1994 - Privatization of 19 parastatals begun.

Somalia None

South Africa None

Sudan 1979, 80, 81, 83 - Various agreements with IMF, all suspended.

1987 - ERP accepted by IMF: devaluation; liberalization of FX controls and trade policy; budget restraint and revenue generating measures. Price increases of essential commodities revoked

1989 - New measures: review of state concerns and banking institutions, and effects of subsidies, measures to increase taxes, spending cuts, and possible introduction of user fees for health and education.

1992 - ERP announced: float pound; increase import and export duties; cut spending; cut subsidies. Popular pressure diminished Govt.'s ability to carry out reforms.

1995 - AMF threatened expulsion for non-payment of arrears; 1996 new agreement concluded.

Swaziland 1995, 96 - Reform public enterprises and tax code; increase sales and luxury tax and reduce corporate tax.

Tanzania 1982 - SAP developed with WB: stimulate agriculture; reduce spending; relax price controls.

1986 - \$45 m. in stand-by credit: devaluation; raise producer prices; freeze minimum wage; reduce budget deficit; remove price controls..

1990 - Economic and Social Action Plan (ESAP).

1991 - 3-yr ESAF; \$100m. per year. 1994 donors suspended payments due to widespread tax evasion.

1996 - New tax unit operational; IMF credit restored. Financial sector revived with 8 private commercial banks.

Togo 1989 - ERP adopted with IMF.

Table 4 (Cont'd)

Country **Program**

Togo 1994 - Devaluation of CFA franc, comprehensive adjustment paln adopted. Increase in growth of 13%.

Uganda 1981-83 - IMF approves \$424 m. in stand-by facilities.

1987 - ERP proposed by Govt.: new shilling; devaluation.

1995 - Uganda Commercial Bank to be privatized; privatize or close 14 other commercial banks; 85% of parastatals to be privatized.

Zambia 1987 - Zambia declared ineligible for credit facilities for non-payment of loans.

1992 - 3-yr SAP with IMF/WB: decentralize social services; reorganize civil service; privatization; devaluation; reduce inflation (limited success); liberalize FX trading. Program had some success, but much left to be done.

Zimbabwe 1991 - ESAP introduced to increase private consumption.

Table 4 (Cont'd)

The Terminology of Structural Adjustment

In Table 4 above several terms were used to describe the types of programs and credits for the various countries. Below is a guide to what each of these is.

An ERP is an economic reform program or package, usually decided upon by the country on its own. Often, however, these become SAPs, or structural adjustment programs, usually drafted with the assistance of IMF/World Bank visitation teams that determine the exact measures needed to improve the functioning of the economy.

If approved by the IMF/WB team, these organizations will proceed with a recommendation for either or both a SAF and a SAL. SAFs, or structural adjustment facilities, are IMF credits to assist the country with short-run balance of payments deficits that result from the SAP. SALs are World Bank structural adjustment loans which help directly with the restructuring effort. An ESAF or extended SAF, is merely an extension of the previous SAF needed because the restructuring is taking longer than anticipated or for the next phase of the restructure.

Since independence the economic performance of the sub-Saharan regio...varied greatly among the forty-five countries included in this study

The IMF is the International Monetary Fund, created at Bretton Woods after World War II for the purpose of assisting member nations facing short term balance of payments deficits. Each member state pays dues and receives credits, or concessionary loans, when needed. Often the mere existence of the stand-by credit is sufficient to diminish the pressure on a country's currency.

The World Bank is actually a group of organizations that make concessionary loans to countries in various stages of their development efforts. The oldest of these, the IBRD or International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was also born at Bretton Woods and was originally intended to assist in the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War. The International Development Agency, or IDA, makes loans to the poorest nations at very concessionary rates. It is, in effect, the bank of last resort for many countries in Africa, and many of its loans are never repaid.

Table 5. Partial List of Sources of Information About Sub-Saharan Africa

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The internet

The Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>.

The State Department publishes periodic business information reports on countries around the world at http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/index.html#country/.

A site that has links to news sources, data sources, country pages, etc. is the Norwegian Council for Africa at <http://www.africaindex.africainfo.no/>.

A major source of African data can be found at

http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Country_Specific/.

For information about languages (and translating the Wycliffe Bible), the Summer Institute of Languages can be found at <http://www.sil.org/>.

For interesting articles about structural adjustment efforts and other financing information, look at the World Bank at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/country.htm/>.

Trade information, by country, can be obtained at (in this case Angola)

<http://www.cgtd.com/global/africa/angola.htm/>.

An online, interactive source of information can be had at

<http://www.cgtd.com/global/african/business-africa.htm/>.

Other sources used:

One of the best source of historical, political, and economic information on Africa is Europa Publications Ltd. Annual series **Africa South of the Sahara**. Europa also has regional series for all regions of the world.

Stephen Silver, Recent Economic Development Efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, unpublished manuscript presented at the Eighth World Congress of Social Economics, 1996.

Stephen Silver, Profiles of Devolution in Africa, in progress.

Figure 1. North Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present

Figure 2. Northeastern Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present

Figure 3. East Africa and Zaire GDP Trends: 1960-Present

Figure 4. West Africa Franc Zone GDP Trends: 1960-Present

Figure 5. Anglophone West Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present

Figure 6. Other West Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present

Figure 7. Central Africa Franc Zone GDP Trends: 1960-Present

Figure 8. Southern Africa GDP Trends: 1960-Present

Figure 9. Indian Ocean and Mozambique GDP Trends: 1960-Present

Figure 10. Four Patterns of Economic Development

[1] World Bank, Accelerated development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington, D.C., 1981) pp. 3-4.

[2]. For a detailed summary and discussion of both the Lagos Plan and Accelerated Development, see [Africa in Economic Crisis](#), edited by John Ravenhill, especially chapters 1-6).

Table 1. Political Data for Sub-Saharan Africa: Independence to Present

Country	Colonial Name	Independence Information			Second Leader			Current Leader		
		Capital	Date	First Leader	Year	Name	How?	Year	Name	How?
Angola	Angola	Luanda	1975	Neto	1979	dos Santos	Neto died	1980	dos Santos	elections
Benin	French West Africa	Porto Novo	1960	Maga	1963	Col. C. Soglo	Mil. coup	1996	N. Soglo	elections
Botswana	Bechuanaland	Gaborone	1966	Khama	1980	Masire	succession	1994	Masire	elections
Burkina Faso	French West Africa	Ouagadougou	1960	M. Yameogo	1966	S. Lamizana	Mil. coup	1991	Campaore	elections
Burundi	Ruanda-Urundi	Bujumbura	1962	King Mwambutsa IV	1966	King Ntare V	deposed	1996	Buyoya	Mil. coup
Cameroon	French Cameroun	Yaounde	1960	Ahidjo	1982	Biya	transfer	1992	Biya	elections
Cape Verde	Cape Verde Is	Praia, Santiago	1975	Pereira	1991	Veiga	elections	1996	Monteiro	elections
Central Afr. Rep.	Oubangui-Chari	Bangui	1960	Dacko	1965	Bokassa	Mil. coup	1993	Patasse	elections
Chad	French Equatorial Africa	N'djamena	1960	Tombalbaye	1975	Malloum	Mil. coup	1996	Deby	elections
Congo, Dem Rep	Belgian Congo	Kinshasa	1960	Kasavubu/Lumumba	1965	Mobutu	Mil. coup	1997	Kabila	Mil. coup
Congo, Republic	French Equatorial Africa	Brazzaville	1960	Youlou	1963	Massamba-Debat	elections	1992	Lissouba	elections
Cote D'Ivoire	Cote D'Ivoire	Yamasoukrou	1960	Houphouet-Boigny	1993	Bedie	succession	1995	Bedie	elections
Djibouti	French Somaliland	Djibouti	1977	Gouled Aptidon				1993	Gouled Aptidon	elections
Eritrea	Ethiopian province	Asmara	1993	Afewerki				1993	Afewerki	elections
Ethiopia	-----	Addis Ababa	-----	Haile Salassie (1930)	1974	Andom	Mil. coup	1995	Gidada	elections
Gabon	French Equatorial Africa	Libreville	1960	M'Ba	1967	Bongo	succession	1993	Bongo	elections
Gambia	The Gambia	Banjul	1965	Jawara	1994	Jammeh	Mil. coup	1996	Jammeh	elections
Ghana	Gold Coast	Accra	1957	Nkrumah	1969	Buisa	elections	1996	Rawlings	elections
Guinea	French Guinea	Conakry	1958	Sekou Toure	1984	Conte	Mil. coup	1993	Conte	elections
Guinea-Bissau	Portugese Guinea	Bissau	1974	Cabral	1980	Vieira	coup	1994	Vieira	elections
Eqatorial Guinea	Spanish Guinea	Malabo	1968	Macias Nguema	1979	Obiang Nguema	Mil. coup	1996	Obiang Nguema	elections
Kenya	Kenya - BEA	Nairobi	1963	Kenyatta	1978	arap Moi	succession	1992	Arap Moi	elections
Lesotho	Basutoland	Maseru	1966	King Moshoeshoe	1970	Chief Jonathan	coup	1996	King Letsie III	succession
Liberia	-----	Monrovia	1847	Tubman (1944)	1971	Tolbert	succession	1997	Taylor	elections
Madagascar	Madagascar	Antananarive	1960	Tsirana	1972	Ramanantsoa	coup	1996	Ratsiraka	elections
Malawi	Nyasaland	Lilongwe	1964	Banda	1994	Muluzi	elections	1994	Muluzi	elections
Mali	Soudan - FWA	Bamako	1960	M. Keita	1968	Traore	coup	1997	Konare	elections
Mauritania	French West Africa	Nouakchott	1960	Daddah	1978	Salek	Mil. coup	1992	Taya	elections
Mauritius	Mauritius	Port Louis	1968	S. Ramgoolam	1982	Jugnauth	elections	1995	N. Ramgoolam	elections
Mozambique	Mozambique	Maputo	1975	Machel	1986	Chissano	succession	1994	Chissano	elections
Namibia	South West Africa	Windhoek	1990	Nujoma				1994	Nujoma	elections
Niger	French West Africa	Niamey	1960	Diori	1974	Kountche	Mil. coup	1996	Mainassara	Mil. coup
Nigeria	Nigeria	Abuja	1960	Balewa	1966	Gowon	Mil. coup	1993	Abacha(dec.)	Mil. coup
Rwanda	Ruanda-Urundi	Kigali	1962	Kayibanda	1973	Habyarimana	Mil. coup	1994	Bizimungu	succession
Senegal	Senegal - FWA	Dakar	1960	Senghor	1981	Diouf	succession	1993	Diouf	elections
Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	Freetown	1961	Margai	1967	Stevens	elections	1997	Koroma	Mil. coup
Seychelles	Seychelles	Victoria	1976	Mancham/Rene	1977	Rene	coup	1993	Rene	elections
Somalia	Somaliland	Mogadishu	1960	Shirmake	1969	Barre	Mil. coup	1991	anarchy	assassination
South Africa	South Africa	Pretoria	1994	Mandela						
Sudan	Anglo-Egyptian Sudan	Khartoum	1956	al-Azhari	1958	Abboud	Mil. coup	1996	al Bashir	elections
Swaziland	Swaziland	Mbabane	1968	King Sobhuza II	1986	King Mswati III	succession	1986	King Mswati III	succession
Tanzania	Tanganyika/Zanzibar - BEA	Dodoma	1961	Nyerere	1985	Mwinyi	succession	1995	Mkapa	elections
Togo	Togoland	Lome	1960	Olympio	1963	Eyadema	Mil. coup	1993	Eyadema	elections
Uganda	Uganda - BEA	Kampala	1962	Obote	1971	Amin	Mil. coup	1996	Museveni	elections
Zambia	Northern Rhodesia	Lusaka	1964	Kaunda	1991	Chiluba	elections	1996	Chiluba	elections
Zimbabwe	Southern Rhodesia	Harare	1980	Mugabe				1996	Mugabe	elections

Table 2. GDP Data for Sub-Saharan: 1960-90

Country	***	Purchasing Power Parity Per capita Real GDP*				Real Per capita GDP Growth Rates			1995/6 GDP Per Capita Using PPP**	Population	Year	Population	1995 GDP Per Capita (Table 3)		
		1960	1970	1980	1990	60-70	70-80	80-90							
Angola	1989	928	1171	675	701	2.33	-5.51	0.42	800	9,698,725	7,758,980,000	Angola	1994	9,698,725	792
Benin		1092	1105	1152	924	0.12	0.42	-2.21	1,440	5,561,000	8,007,840,000	Benin	1995	5,561,000	373
Botswana	1989	525	815	1929	2172	4.4	8.62	1.32	3,100	1,456,000	4,513,600,000	Botswana	1995/96	1,456,000	2,837
Burkina Faso		457	373	457	511	-2.03	2.03	1.12	740	10,200,000	7,548,000,000	Burkina Faso	1995	10,200,000	228
Burundi		631	342	482	550	-6.12	3.43	1.32	600	6,090,000	3,654,000,000	Burundi	1995	6,090,000	149
Cameroon		634	804	1195	1229	2.38	3.96	0.28	1,230	13,277,000	16,330,710,000	Cameroon	1995	13,277,000	530
Cape Verde		471	637	939	1059	3.02	3.88	1.2	1,000	369,498	369,498,000	Cape Verde	1993	369,498	914
Central African Republic		699	744	706	580	0.62	-0.52	-1.97	800	3,029,937	2,423,949,600	Central African Republic	1995	3,029,937	376
Chad		743	656	527	400	-1.25	-2.19	-2.76	600	6,214,000	3,728,400,000	Chad	1995	6,214,000	148
Comoros		544	698	631	564	2.49	-1.01	-1.12	650	454,932	295,705,771	Comoros	1993	454,932	576
Congo, Democratic Rep.	1989	487	688	474	424	3.46	-3.73	-1.24	400	41,274,659	16,509,863,600	Congo, Democratic Republic	1995	41,274,659	126
Congo, Republic		1107	1671	1931	2211	4.12	1.45	1.35	1,960	2,590,000	5,076,400,000	Congo, Republic	1995	2,590,000	777
Djibouti	1987	na	1899	1532	1203	na	-2.15	-3.45	1,200	602,707	723,248,400	Djibouti	1995	602,707	824
Equatorial Guinea									800	388,950	310,680,000	Equatorial Guinea	1994	388,950	332
Eritrea									430	3,866,123	2,203,690,110	Eritrea	1995	3,866,123	157
Ethiopia	1986	257	297	324	312	1.45	0.87	-0.63	570	56,877,100	24,371,153,000	Ethiopia	1995	56,877,100	79
Gabon		1779	3693	4803	3958	7.3	2.63	-1.94	5,400	1,073,313	5,795,890,200	Gabon	1995	1,073,313	4,768
Gambia		614	728	1021	798	1.7	3.38	-2.46	1,100	1,088,342	1,197,176,200	Gambia	1995	1,088,342	331
Ghana		886	1062	978	902	1.81	-0.82	-0.81	1,530	17,332,836	26,519,239,080	Ghana	1995	17,332,836	363
Guinea		554	467	817	766	-1.71	5.59	-0.64	950	6,956,139	6,608,332,050	Guinea	1995	6,956,139	528
Guinea-Bissau		500	704	470	689	3.42	-4.04	3.83	950	1,073,000	1,019,350,000	Guinea-Bissau	1993	1,073,000	219
Ivory Coast		1101	1622	1816	1214	3.87	1.13	-4.03	1,620	14,230,000	23,052,600,000	Ivory Coast	1995	14,230,000	708
Kenya		646	589	910	911	-0.92	4.35	0.01	1,400	30,522,000	42,730,800,000	Kenya	1995	30,522,000	298
Lesotho		312	421	991	968	3	8.56	-0.23	1,860	2,029,889	3,775,593,540	Lesotho	1995	2,029,889	308
Liberia	1986	721	985	928	788	3.12	-0.6	-2.73	1,100	2,760,000	3,036,000,000	Liberia	1995	2,760,000	n.a.
Madagascar		1187	1146	984	675	-0.35	-1.52	-3.77	880	12,935,473	11,383,216,240	Madagascar	1995	12,935,473	247
Malawi		380	441	554	519	1.49	2.28	-0.65	800	10,333,578	8,266,862,400	Malawi	1995	10,333,578	142
Mali		528	418	532	530	-2.34	2.41	-0.04	600	10,795,000	6,477,000,000	Mali	1995	10,795,000	217
Mauritania		785	875	881	791	1.09	0.07	-1.08	1,200	2,284,000	2,740,800,000	Mauritania	1994	2,284,000	450
Mauritius		2840	2389	3989	5835	-1.73	5.13	3.8	10,300	1,122,118	11,557,815,400	Mauritius	1995	1,122,118	3,523
Mozambique		1145	1497	921	760	2.68	-4.86	-1.92	670	17,423,000	11,673,410,000	Mozambique	1995	1,594,000	86
Namibia		1761	2619	2900	2852	3.97	1.02	-0.17	3,700	1,594,000	5,897,800,000	Namibia	1995	17,423,000	1,949
Niger	1989	537	802	717	505	4.01	-1.12	-3.89	640	8,870,185	5,676,918,400	Niger	1995	8,870,185	213
Nigeria		560	767	1436	995	3.15	6.27	-3.67	1,380	97,223,521	134,168,458,980	Nigeria	1995	97,223,521	672
Reunion	1989	1100	1963	2829	2988	5.79	3.65	0.61	4,300	621,379	2,671,931,034	Reunion	1992	621,379	10,400
Rwanda		535	647	759	756	1.9	1.6	-0.04	400	8,064,271	3,225,708,400	Rwanda	1995	8,064,271	155
Senegal		1062	1148	1134	1145	0.78	-0.12	0.1	1,700	8,347,000	14,189,900,000	Senegal	1995	8,347,000	579
Seychelles		1253	1668	2900	3973	2.86	5.53	3.15	6,000	71,845	431,070,000	Seychelles	1993	71,845	6,499
Sierra Leone	1961	883	1439	1139	902	5.43	-2.34	-2.33	980	4,509,000	4,418,820,000	Sierra Leone	1984/95	4,509,000	209
Somalia	1989	1100	918	741	775	-1.81	-2.14	0.5	500	7,114,431	3,557,215,500	Somalia	1988	7,114,431	78
South Africa		2185	3264	3496	3250	4.01	0.69	-0.73	5,400	41,244,500	222,720,300,000	South Africa	1995	41,244,500	3,247
Sudan		na	901	840	749	na	0.42	-2.27	860	27,323,000	23,497,780,000	Sudan	1992	27,323,000	119
Swaziland	1989	1240	2507	3041	2550	7.04	1.93	-1.96	3,800	661,222	2,512,643,600	Swaziland	1995/96	661,222	1,760
Tanzania	1988	315	424	480	534	2.97	1.24	1.33	650	28,251,511	18,363,482,150	Tanzania	1995	28,251,511	186
Togo		371	614	730	641	5.04	1.73	-1.3	970	4,045,840	3,924,464,800	Togo	1995	4,045,840	320
Uganda		596	647	534	554	0.82	-1.92	0.37	900	18,764,151	16,887,735,900	Uganda	1995/96	18,764,151	334
Zambia	1990	946	1113	969	688	1.63	-1.39	-3.42	1,060	9,373,000	9,935,380,000	Zambia	1995	9,373,000	352
Zimbabwe	1990	998	1087	1207	1181	0.85	1.05	-0.22	2,340	11,588,230	27,116,458,200	Zimbabwe	1995	11,588,230	570
AFRICA									1,347	568,615,805	765,819,870,555				

*Summers, Robert and Heston, Alan, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988", Quarterly Journal Of Economics, vol 106, no. 9 (May 1991).


**Central Intelligence Agency, "World Fact Book".

***Years used if data for 1960 or 1990 not available.


Table 3. Economic and Financial Data for Sub-Saharan Africa: 1995 or Latest Data

	Year	Population	GDP (\$m US)	GDP local	Currency	xr	GDP pc
Angola	1994	9,698,725	7,682	-----	new kwanza	-----	792
Benin	1995	5,561,000	2,075	1,036	10^9 CFA	499.15	373
Botswana	1995/96	1,456,000	4,131	14,631	10^6 pula]	3.542	2,837
Burkina Fasso	1995	10,200,000	2,330	1,163	10^9 CFA	499.15	228
Burundi	1995	6,090,000	909	308,314	10^6 Bur. Franc	339.2	149
Cameroon	1995	13,277,000	7,038	3,513	10^9 CFA	499.15	530
Cape Verde	1993	369,498	338	27,151	10^6 escudo	80.427	914
Central African Republic	1995	3,029,937	1,139	569	10^9 CFA	499.15	376
Chad	1995	6,214,000	919	459	10^9 CFA	499.15	148
Comoros	1993	454,932	262	74,261	10^6 Comoro franc	283.16	576
Congo, Dem. Rep. of (Zaire)	1995	41,274,659	5,214	36,622	10^9 Old Zaire	7024	126
Congo, Republic of	1995	2,590,000	2,011	1,004	10^9 CFA	499.15	777
Djibouti	1995	602,707	497	87,994	10^6 Djibouti Franc	177.12	824
Equatorial Guinea	1994	388,350	129	72	10^9 CFA	555.2	332
Eritrea	1995	3,866,123	608	3,905	10^6 birr	6.426	157
Ethiopia	1995	56,677,100	4,485	33,306	10^6 birr	7.426	79
Gabon	1995	1,073,313	5,117	2,554	10^9 CFA	499.15	4,768
Gambia	1995	1,088,342	360	3,439	10^6 dalasi	9.546	331
Ghana	1995	17,332,836	6,295	7,557,167	10^6 new cedi	1200.43	363
Guinea	1995	6,956,139	3,673	3,642	10^9 French Guinea	991.4	528
Guinea-Bissau	1993	1,073,000	235	2,365,720	10^6 Guinea peso	10,082	219
Ivory Coast	1995	14,230,000	10,080	5,031	10^9 CFA	499.15	708
Kenya	1995	30,522,000	9,097	467,852	10^6 Kenya shilling	51.43	298
Lesotho	1995	2,029,889	625	2,764	10^6 maloti	4.4205	308
Liberia	1995	2,760,000	Unavailable - civil war		Liberian \$	1	n.a.
Madagascar	1995	12,935,473	3,198	13,640	10^9 MG	4265.6	247
Malawi	1995	10,333,578	1,470	22,472	10^6 Malawi kwancha	15.2837	142
Mali	1995	10,795,000	2,341	1,169	10^9 CFA	499.15	217
Mauritania	1994	2,284,000	1,027	127	10^9 ouguiya	123.575	450
Mauritius	1995	1,122,118	3,953	68,728	10^6 Maur. rupee	17.386	3,523
Mozambique	1995	17,423,000	1,499	13,530	10^9 metical	9024.3	86
Namibia	1995	1,594,000	3,106	11,267	10^6 Namibian \$	3.62709	1,949
Niger	1995	8,870,185	1,887	942	10^9 CFA	499.15	213
Nigeria	1995	97,223,521	65,312	1,430,000	10^6 Naira	21.895	672
Reunion	1992	621,379			10^6 French franc	5.00	10,400
Rwanda	1995	8,064,271	1,249	327,485	10^6 Rwanda Franc	262.2	155
Senegal	1995	8,347,000	4,835	2,413	10^9 CFA	499.15	579
Seychelles	1993	71,845	467	2,419	10^6 Seychelles Rupee	5.1815	6,499
Sierra Leone	1994/95	4,509,000	941	710,389	10^6 leone	755.22	209
Somalia	1988	7,114,431	555	94,647	10^6 shilling	170.45	78
South Africa	1995	41,244,500	133,941	485,752	10^6 Rand	3.6266	3,247
Sudan	1992	27,323,000	3,241	315,778	10^6 Sudan pound	97.43	119
Swaziland	1995/96	661,222	1,163	4,161	10^6 emalangen	3.5765	1,760
Tanzania	1995	28,251,511	5,255	3,020,499	10^6 Tanz. shilling	574.76	186
Togo	1995	4,045,840	1,296	646,700	10^6 CFA	499.15	320
Uganda	1995/96	18,764,151	6,272	6,077,035	10^6 new shilling	968.9	334
Zambia	1995	9,373,000	3,297	2,826,300	10^6 Zambia kwacha	857.23	352
Zimbabwe	1995	11,588,230	6,606	57,196	10^6 Zimbabwe \$	8.658	570
46 African countries		568,615,805	328,160				577
United States		300,000,000	7,500,000				25,000


North Africa




Northeastern Africa




East Africa and Zaire




West Africa Franc Zone




Anglophone West Africa




Other West Africa



Central Africa Franc Zone



Southern Africa



Indian Ocean and Mozambique





Figure 10. Four Patterns of Economic Development



- (-, -) CAR, Chad, Comoros, Rep. Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Reunion, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Zambia
- (+, -) Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, Zimbabwe
- (-, +) Angola, D.R. Congo, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda
- (+, +) None